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Incursion at Howz-e Madad
An Afghanistan Vignette
Sean M. Maloney

O

n 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan
National Army forces supported by Dutch
and American air forces conducted one of a series
of incursions into the Zharey District west of
Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation
SEASONS, was representative of operations
undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
this area and is an evolution from how Canadian
ground forces have been employed since they
were re-introduced to the region in 2005. This
account is based on the personal experiences of
the author who observed these combat operations
while they were in progress.1

The Terrain

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) IS2007-7230

I

t has become a media cliché to use the phrase
“the volatile Zharey District,” but it is fairly
accurate. Zharey District occupies what amounts
to a triangle of well-cultivated land north of the
Arghandab river, west of Kandahar
C i t y.
The top of the triangle parallels
Highway 1, the main and
only paved east-west
highway between
K a n d a h a r C i t y,
Helmand province,
and then to Herat.
Highway 1 meets
Highway 4 east
of Kandahar City,
which in turn

links the entire southern part of Afghanistan
with Spinboldak and then to Quetta in Pakistan.
Insurgent forces occupying Zharey can
theoretically interfere with commerce on Highway
1 which can have detrimental economic effects
on the region, not just the province.
South of Highway 1 can only be described
in military terms as complex terrain. Though
Zharey District is fairly small compared to
other provincial districts, it consists of a densepacked array of grape-growing ditches, walled
compounds, walled fields, irrigation streams
covered with foliage, and narrow tracks. Grape
drying huts, in the middle of the trench-like rows
of grape ditches, are made of mud that has dried
into concrete which effectively turns them into
ready-made bunkers with firing ports.
South of the Arghandab River lies Panjwayi
District which for the most part resembles
Zharey District in terms of complex terrain. A
steep hill line separates most of Panjwayi from
the Arghandab River: the combination of the two
presents a significant obstacle and discourages
north-south traffic with two exceptions: there are
fords at Bazaar-e Panjwayi, a significant town
and market place; and another to the west. The
terrain north of Highway 1 and to the west of
Zharey is open and arid. The Reg Desert lies to
the south and south west of Panjwayi District.
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What of the human
terrain? Zharey
District is the product
of a redistricting
process conducted
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in 2003 designed to rationalize the physical
conformation of the land to provincial district
administration. Consequently, Zharey was
carved out of several other districts: Panjwayi,
Arghandab, and Maywand. The tribal overlay,
of course, does not conform to the artificial
administrative overlay. Zharey District is
completely dominated by Pashtuns, though they
come from both Pashtun Confederations: the
Durrani and Ghilzai which have competed for
dominance of the area for centuries. At least six
tribal groups are present in Zharey District.
Canada’s involvement with Zharey District
dates from 2005-06 when the Canadian-led
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) working
with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade attempted
to assess the area for aid and reconstruction
purposes. At that time American forces were
attacked along Highway 1 on a regular basis
by small numbers of Taliban forces operating
from Zharey. Task Force BAYONET, which was
understrength, focused on the Shah Wali Kot
district of Kandahar Province and did not have
the resources to deal with Zharey. At this time,
most of the action was in Oruzgan Province
north of Kandahar and Zabol Province to the
northeast. The Shah Wali Kot district operations
were supporting this effort. In effect, Zharey was
a no-go area for the PRT, which instead focused
its efforts on Panjwayi District and elsewhere.
These contacts led to better information on
activities in Zharey and when the Canadians
took over Regional Command South (RC South)
in January-February 2006, there was increased
interest in the district.

Throughout the spring
of 2006, it was more
and more apparent that
the Quetta Shura, the
council leading the antiAfghanistan and anticoalition effort out of
Pakistan, had shifted its
operational approach
to RC South. A steady
increase in infiltration
of both personnel and
weapons was detected
and by the summer
several pre - emptive
actions were conducted
by Task Force ORION, the
Canadian battlegroup based on 1st Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1
PPCLI). One of these operations was the first full
battalion-sized combat operation since Korea.
The enemy was forced to either reinforce Zharey
or pull out and leave a small presence. The Quetta
Shura decided to make a stand and massively
re-infiltrated Zharey in August 2006. This led to
Operation MEDUSA, a Canadian-led, brigadesized multinational operation that inflicted
significant damage on the enemy forces in Zharey
and Panjwayi districts. There were, however, not
enough resources to garrison Zharey with Afghan
police or paramilitary forces.
The follow-on operation, BAAZ TSUKA, was
mounted in December 2006. This was a Dutchled multinational operation (RC South had
changed from Canadian to Dutch command)
designed in part to sweep through Zharey once
again and then leave an Afghan security force
presence behind to facilitate development and
aid activities. For the most part, enemy forces
melted away in the face of the ISAF onslaught
and reverted to pre-2006 tactics. Again, there
were simply not enough police or paramilitary
forces to exert control over the entire district
and the development effort stalled in the western
parts of the district. The decision was made to
focus the police and aid effort on the quieter
Panjwayi District and to contain Zharey as much
as possible.
This effort was called Operation BAAZ TSUKA
Phase III. NATO ISAF forces established an
enduring presence in the area in the form of several
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Right: Major David Quick, ofﬁcer
commanding India Company, 2 RCR.

firebases to supplement existing
ones. Forward Operating Base
Masum Ghar (called FOB MSG
by the troops) was constructed
on the hills south of the river
overwatching Zharey District.
To the north along Highway 1 was Patrol Base
Wilson (PBW) which had been established by
TF ORION the previous year to assist with route
control activities in order to facilitate the British
deployment to Helmand Province. Other ISAF
forces operated from Maywand district west of
Zharey along Highway 1.

The Plan

I

n the spring of 2007, the Canadian battlegroup,
based on 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian
Regiment (2 RCR), deployed to Zharey and
Panjwayi districts. India Company, 2 RCR and “A”
Squadron, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH
(RC)) based out of MSG, while “C” Company, 3
PPCLI and a detachment of M-777 guns from “D”
Battery, 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery (2 RCHA) operated from the Sperwan
Ghar (SWG) FOB located in Panjwayi. At this
time, the Canadian Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Team (OMLT), led by Lieutenant-Colonel
(LCol) Ken Eyre, worked closely with elements
from the Afghan National Army 205 Corps that
were based out of MSG. LCol Rob Walker, the
Commanding Officer of the battlegroup, knew
that neither he nor the Afghan security forces had
the resources to occupy Zharey and that those
forces would not be available in the near future:
there were barely enough to handle the vital parts
of Panjwayi. Working with Major David Quick,
officer commanding (OC) India Company, the
battlegroup developed a concept of operations
designed to keep enemy forces off-balance in
Zharey, in effect to deny them the ability to
re-build infrastructure that could serve as a
mounting base later; to prevent any substantial
build up of conventional or near conventional
forces along the lines of what occurred in 2006;
and to reduce the enemy’s ability to interfere
with commerce and ISAF resupply traffic on
Highway 1.
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Far right: Lieutenant-Colonel Rob
Walker, commanding ofﬁcer of the
Canadian battlegroup.
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The everlasting issue of what constituted
enemy activity in the district caused some
problems. When Canadian forces built a combat
road (Route SUMMIT) from Bazaar-e Panjwayi to
Highway 1, there were unintended consequences.
The construction of this road diverted water in
the east end of Zharey. Age-old and intricate tribal
agreements over water use were now disrupted.
Certain communities now had the potential
upper hand over others and resentments built up
bordering on violence. A Canadian solution was
to put in culverts to restore the water use patterns
– but the culverts made ideal locations for IED
(improvised explosive device) attack against
forces using Route SUMMIT. When culverts
were blown up, was this Taliban activity or not?
If one community resorted to AK-47 use over a
diverted stream, was this Taliban action? What
if Canadian troops were caught in the crossfire?
Or, what if Afghan police from one area were
conducting activities on behalf of someone else for
pay because they had not received monies from
their own chain of command for months? These
factors complicated any Canadian response to
activity in Zharey District. That said, there were
organized Taliban teams and sub-units operating
in the area in significant but not overwhelming
numbers. Their intent was to resuscitate the
severely damaged Taliban structure in the
district.
Indeed, the use of intelligence - driven
operations placed a premium on the need for
multiple information sources that could be rapidly
cross-checked. Such operations demanded
substantial understanding of personalities,
Afghan tribal culture, local grievances, historical
relationships and how all of this had evolved over
the past 20 years. In all cases, the battlegroup
and company commanders would have to operate
with incomplete information and rely to a certain
extent on their hard-won experience with Zharey
65
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District, something not easily transferable in any
handover between units. Gut instinct became as
important, possibly even more important, than
any super-secret SIGINT intercept scooped up
from something orbiting in space.
In effect, the battlegroup did not have a
singular, linear plan like Operations MEDUSA or
BAAZ TSUKA. The overall plan was to mount a
series of short-term sorties into Zharey as targets
presented themselves, or to conduct sorties to
flush-out enemy in a particular area to force them
to react into flight or fight mode. This approach
meant that the limited number of ISAF and ANA
forces did not need to garrison Zharey. It was
denial, not occupation, that was key. Randomness
was crucial. There was to be no pattern to
coalition operations and the maximal use of night
cover and deception operations was critical, given
that the enemy had significant observation assets,
knew exactly what the battlegroup consisted of
and what it was capable of doing. MSG is a fairly
exposed FOB on the side of a hill and an enemy
scout with binoculars in Zharey does not have
to leave home to see what is there.
A previous India Company operation had
rattled enemy leadership in Zharey. Information
came into battlegroup HQ that some 50 enemy
fighters had narrowly avoided this previous

sweep operation and were moving to link up with
another cell, which was estimated to have 30
fighters. These forces were equipped with AK-47
and PKM automatic weapons, rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs), and 82 mm recoilless rifles. A
dead enemy commander, killed during a parallel
operation involving coalition special operations
forces (SOF) was about to be replaced and the
new leader was on his way. They would all be
in the vicinity of the Howz-e Madad bazaar and
compound complex. The planning cycle for
Operation SEASONS had begun.
The geographical position of Howz-e Madad
explains why this cluster of dun-coloured
compounds is important. As Highway 1 traverses
Zharey from east to west, it curves off from
the Zharey green belt and heads northwest to
Maywand District. The point where it curves off
is the point where Zahrey’s green belt ends and
arid open terrain starts. It is the last opportunity
for insurgent forces to attack traffic on Highway
1 and retreat into the complex terrain of the
green belt. Ambushes west of the green belt are
potentially suicidal. There is nowhere to run and
a 25 mm round from a LAV-III (light armoured
vehicle) or a 30 mm round from an AH-64
Apache helicopter gunship is faster in any event.
Ambush operations conducted from the west
end of Zharey have a better chance of success to

Photo by author

The LAV-III infantry combat vehicle is the standard vehicle for 2 RCR in Afghanistan. The narrow hull allows it to penetrate
constrained areas of Zharey District that would otherwise remain impassable. Its 25mm gun is devastating against
enemy in the open or in positions.
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On-call artillery employed during the Howz-e Madad action included one M-177 155 mm gun ﬁring from a FOB in
Panjwayi District. The M-777 is highly-accurate and is airportable when slung under CH-47 Chinook helicopters.

those conducted from the east end. At the east
end, Zharey tapers into a point and there is less
depth to retreat into before hitting the river and
the hill line.
In addition, enemy infiltration routes and
“rat lines” come into Zharey from west and south
west, from Helmand Province. Enemy personnel
usually rest in the western part of the district after
their long journey before deploying to sites east.
In addition larger weapons caches are broken
down and then dispersed east. When truck traffic
is used by the enemy, Howz-e Madad is the first
stop along Highway 1, making it a convenient
location. The police in the area are unreliable as
the Taliban pays them more money with greater
frequency than the government.
The scheme of maneuver that Major Quick,
LCol Walker and LCol Shereen Shah agreed
on was to move India Company by LAV-III to a
drop off point and conduct a night march into a
blocking position south of Howz-e Madad. The
LAV’s were to continue along the highway to
draw enemy eyes away. Then two troops of the
Strathconas’ Leopard C-2 tanks (callsign T-1A)
led by Captain Craig Volstead accompanied by an
Afghan infantry company from 2-1-205 Kandak

(with the OMLT attached) mounted in armed
pickup trucks, and the battlegroup command
post (callsign 9er Tac) would then sortie from
MSG, move along Highway 1 and then swing
south to catch the enemy, like a hammer striking
an anvil.

The Action

A

t 0337 hours on 20 June, there was a slight
delay in the departure of the tank-Afghan
infantry force when a key member of the command
post severely cut himself by accident. This was
just as well as not all of the ISTAR resources2
were in place: it took the Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (or TUAV - the Canadian Sperwer
system) nicknamed SKIDOO (so-named because
the machine has a Bombardier Skidoo engine),
time to fly from its base to Zharey. At 0353
hours, LCol Walker took the lead with his LAV-III
and the force moved out along Route SUMMIT.
India Company had already deployed and was
in position. At 0430 9er Tac, accompanied by
an artillery forward observation officer/forward
air controller (FOO/FAC) LAV-III and a security
element moved into a position north of Highway
1 opposite Howz-e Madad. The area was carefully

Photo by author

The Leopard C-2 medium tank is employed by “A” Squadron LdSH (RC) in operations in Zharey District. The
Leopard C-2 shown here is equipped with a mine plow not unlike those developed during the Second World War.
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Left: This is an aerial photo of a typical compound complex
in Zharey District. Note the walled ﬁelds and tree-covered
irrigation streams.
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Below: Grape growing trenches like this blanket the terrain
in Zharey District. Note the grape drying huts irregularly
spaced throughout the ﬁelds.

The battle area requires some description. In
effect, there were several compound complexes
(see map on next page) and a wadi system, all
surrounded by grape trenches. Each walled
compound and its associated outbuildings
formed natural defensive positions and usually
held several extended families. In this case, the
enemy had temporarily depopulated part of the
area. The complexes were connected by narrow
roads and tracks, most of them lined with high
mud walls on either side.
India Company deployed to its blocking
position called Objective RED without incident
during the night. When the Leopard/Afghan
National Army “hammer” came down south

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008
CFJIC IS2007-7261

checked for
mines and IEDs on
arrival. The first contact
with the enemy was at 0435
hours, just at dawn. Red tracer fire
arced across the sky from west to east and a
forward air controller immediately called for air
support. The two on-call USAF A-10 Warthogs
were now on the way.

from Highway 1
to meet the “anvil”
(Objective RED), there
was no contact. Then the
enemy started firing from Objective
BLUE at the forces moving around
Objective RED. But BLUE was southeast of
RED, not north. India Company engaged BLUE
but the enemy then opened up from BLACK,
to the south of RED. And then from another
location to the west, a single shooter wounded an
ANA soldier from some distance. A “nine liner”
MEDEVAC request went out and a US Army
UH-60 Blackhawk was dispatched to collect
the wounded. A variety of ISTAR assets were
now orbiting the battle and the information was
continuously fed to LCol Walker. Intelligence
revealed a pickup truck with an enemy RPG
team moving in from the west. A fire mission
was called in to suppress the shooter and the
RPG team. At this point there was a detachment
of Canadian M-777 155 mm guns at another
fire base, commanded by Lieutenant Eric Ross.
Only one gun was operational, however, but the
volume of fire made it look as if a half-battery
was in action.
The Afghan company and OMLT started to
conduct a detailed search of several compounds
while the Leopard tanks moved to form a cordon.
At this point, 0506 hours, a Canadian soldier
Opposite: Afghan National Army soldiers set up behind
a wall during a dawn skirmish with the Taliban.
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was wounded and moved to a casualty collection
point. India Company held Objective RED, the
tanks were observing to the west, and the plan
was now to move a platoon from India Company
to Objective GREEN. ISTAR resources then
detected what they suspected was a significant
dismounted enemy force south of Objective
BLACK. As the platoon was breaking contact from
RED to move to GREEN, another Canadian was
wounded.
The FOO/FAC co-located with India Company,
callsign G 12, was engaged with RPG and small
arms fire and saw the enemy was reinforcing from
the southwest. The question for LCol Walker was
this: was the enemy bringing in forces to cover
an extraction of their engaged forces, or was the
enemy reinforcing the fight? ISTAR resources
were tasked to find out and were directed further
south. India Company at this time was engaged by
14 enemy personnel equipped with RPGs firing
from positions directly south of BLACK and it
looked like a pickup truck was moving in from
the west to assist them. An A-10 was brought in
to engage and it opened up with its GAU-8 30mm
gun on these enemy forces.

The situation as it stood at 0517 hours had a
Canadian platoon with the Leopards on Objective
GREEN preparing to move to Objective BLACK;
a Canadian platoon on Objective RED, with the
ANA company consolidating compounds behind
the Canadian screen. Suddenly, 15 enemy were
engaged northeast of GREEN. LCol Walker
instructed the force to assume an all-round
defensive posture, consolidate the interior of the
“goose egg” and prepare to meet several attacks.
The ANA company was to move to BLACK and
sweep it east to west.
Three close air support missions were
flown by USAF A-10s and the Dutch F-16s
that showed up to replace them to the south
of BLACK to suppress enemy fire. The three
coalition wounded were by this time in an
armoured TLAV ambulance (a modified and
completely re-built M-113 APC) and were moving
to a helicopter landing site for evacuation by the
UH-60 Blackhawk. Significantly, the UH-60 came
in alone without its usual AH-64 Apache escort.
There were simply not enough AH’s available that
morning with other coalition operations ongoing
elsewhere.

CFJIC AR2007-A060-0085

CFJIC IS2007-7246

Above: A US Army UH-60 Blackhawk
MEDEVAC stands off while the dust generated
by an artillery strike abates. It will then ﬂy in
and extract coalition casualties.
Left: A close-up of the American MEDEVAC
helicopter as it lands to evacuate the
wounded Afghan National Army soldiers.
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Enemy survivors from the A-10 and F-16
sorties tried to break contact and headed west.
At the same time, five enemy with RPGs moved
north to replace them and fired at Canadians in
the vicinity of BLACK. Then enemy in a grape
drying hut southeast of BLACK opened up
with small arms. The TUAV also located three
“squirters,” survivors of the A-10 strafing, hiding
in a tree line. G 12, the artillery FOO/FAC, tried
to acquire them when the TUAV then picked up
what looked like 50 persons moving to the west
of the battle. When queried, the operators noted
that none appeared to be carrying weapons.
Callsign 66B, a sniper detachment, then engaged
enemy targets occupying rooftops to the west.
Were the 50 people reinforcements? Were they
civilians fleeing? Snipers observed individuals
that were not part of the group equipped with
RPGs and they looked like they were a separate
entity. But nobody could be sure. Major Quick
instructed that no action be taken until a positive
identification could be made.
In effect, the combined Canadian-Afghan
force was in a hedgehog posture at 0550 hours.
LCol Walker’s intention was to let the enemy
come to him and then kill them. It appeared as
though there were enemy standing and fighting
in small groups all around the hedgehog, some
enemy were withdrawing, and at the same time it
appeared as though there were two large groups
of enemy approaching from the south and south
west. At 0610 hours, the wounded were flown
out by helicopter.
The snipers require some mention. Sniper
information flowed into the command post like

TUAV information and was a notable proportion
of the information picture. At the same time, 66B
snipers killed an enemy RPG team with shots at
ranges of 700 metres.
At this time, the ANA encountered some
insurgents hiding in the Objective BLACK
compounds and set about clearing them. Searches
continued for information as much as insurgents.
LCol Walker took stock of the situation at 0605
hours. The enemy was taken by surprise by the
incursion. ISTAR information indicated this as
did their behavior on the ground. It appeared as
though the 50 persons to the west were civilians
and not reinforcements, through there were still
enemy present to the west in small numbers
firing sporadically. The TUAV then spotted
organized enemy on Objective YELLOW to the
west. The Leopards traversed and opened fire.
The situation at BLACK was, however, confused.
As the Afghan company cleared the site, an RPG
opened up on them from behind, i.e. to the north,
which wounded two Afghan soldiers. A Leopard
was brought in and the RPG team was killed with
main armament fire.
The enemy again attempted to introduce
two-man RPG teams into the interior of the
hedgehog using grape trenches and wadi systems.
There also appeared to be more enemy hiding in
Objective BLACK. The Afghan company engaged
in close combat in the compounds to ensure once
and for all they were cleared. Then the TUAV
operators reported that the enemy was hiding
RPG teams among the civilian population moving
south of BLACK. LCol Walker concluded that
were using the civilians as shields and held fire.

CFJIC AR2007-A060-0085

Canadian commanders received crucial information during the battle from ISTAR resources, such as the Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (or TUAV - also known as the Canadian Sperwer system). Here, a Sperwer is launched from
its base at Kandahar Airﬁeld.
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The Afghan company then struck gold. As they
moved slightly east of BLACK, they uncovered a
cache. They were immediately engaged, but were
covered by Leopard HESH rounds and coaxial
machinegun fire as they exploited this site.
New information arrived in the command
post. The enemy was trying to introduce 82 mm
recoilless rifle teams into the battle. Their intent
was most likely to engage and kill a Canadian
Leopard or other armoured vehicle. This would
have significant spin-off effects. It would be a
morale victory for enemy forces showing that
tanks could be engaged and destroyed. It would
have an impact in the Canadian media and tie
up Canada’s military leadership who would be

forced to explain to the vociferous critics why they
deployed tanks to Afghanistan in the first place
and why Canada needed tanks at all. Instructions
were therefore issued to give priority to the
destruction of anything resembling an 82 mm
recoilless rifle team.
As another UH-60 arrived to evacuate the
wounded around 0644 hours, the battle entered
a lull. It was already getting stiflingly hot and
in a matter of hours it would reach the point
where Leopard crews in their un-air conditioned
vehicles would be increasingly incapacitated.
The crews joked that IV solution bags should
be hung on the turret ceilings for re-hydration
purposes.

CFJIC IS2007-7233

Below: Artillery strike goes in at Howz-e Madad
as seen from the battlegroup command post
vehicle.

Photo by author

Left: A group of Canadian Forces and Afghan
National Army soldiers prepare to return ﬁre during
a dawn skirmish with the Taliban.
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A Canadian platoon and combat engineers
from 42 Field Squadron consolidated Objective
BLACK. There they found Taliban graffiti
and weapons all over the complex. Sensitive
Site Exploitation (SSE) and Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) activities commenced on
several locations. SSEs are designed to produce
intelligence on enemy structures, operations
and intentions, while BDA is designed to assist
in improving operational effectiveness. The
engineers uncovered a significant cache at
BLACK. Initial reports were that there were
RPGs, artillery shells, and a variety of other
explosives stockpiled there. The assessments
continued when more reports came in that
there was significant civilian movement to the
west and southwest. At this point LCol Walker
and Major Quick were considering a move onto
Objective YELLOW to clean it out. Then at 0703
hours a Canadian platoon and its accompanying
Leopards were engaged with small arms fire.
Simultaneously, back north of Highway 1 the
battlegroup command post LAV III suddenly
traversed its turret onto a white car that was
moving at speed towards 9er Tac. The car was
dissuaded from coming closer and sped off in the
direction it came from. There is no classic “rear
area” and all coalition forces must be capable
of defending themselves at all times no matter
what activity they are engaged in. There were a
series of explosions to the west, which sounded
like RPGs but remain unexplained as there was
no damage to friendly forces. It is possible poor
enemy ammunition handling resulted in the
detonation of reinforcement stocks.

CFJIC IS2007-7259

Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad

Top: Sergeant Brian Durelle, India Company, 2 RCR,
takes a breather while a Leopard tank stands watch.
Centre: A group of Canadian and Afghan National Army
soldiers prepare to move against the Taliban.
Bottom: A group of Afghan National Army talk tactics
following the action at Howz-e Madad.

CFJIC IS2007-7232

After 0700 hours, the enemy renewed his
activities to the southeast of BLACK. There were
three groupings of Taliban firing onto BLACK but
they were using cover: buildings, walls, grape
trenches which all made target identification
difficult for the Leopards and the platoon on
BLACK. The Leopards used coaxial machine gun
fire to suppress enemy fire while the infantry
picked out individual insurgents and killed them
with aimed shots. Fire resumed against BLACK
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Top: Canadian Forces Medical Technicians Corporal
Sonja Briere (foreground) and Corporal Vay Tu care
for an Afghan National Army soldier wounded during
operations on 20 June 2007.

CFJIC IS2007-72402

CFJIC IS2007-7240

CFJIC IS2007-7241

Centre & Bottom: Canadian Forces Combat Engineers
carry the wounded Afghan soldier to a waiting armoured
TLAV ambulance

from the south as well, which brought with it an
A-10 strafing run (the terrain south of BLACK is
much more open and conducive to this type of air
support). The two A-10s rolled in, popped flares,
and fired extended bursts of its 30 mm gun,
which sounds like heaven being ripped open.
Elements of the Afghan company in positions
northwest of BLACK started taking sporadic fire
and a Badger armoured engineer vehicle was
moved in to breach a high wall so that the Afghans
could deal with this threat. There was another
lull that lasted until 0726 hours. Another SSE,
this one conducted by the Afghans, discovered
a Taliban command post which had significant
information in it. Then enemy ammunition cached
in a grape drying hut exploded without warning
and everyone took cover. Other SSE activities
uncovered RPG launchers and RPG rounds.
Most important, a stock of artillery rounds that
were in the process of being converted to IEDs
was discovered, as were IED detonators and
other critical components necessary for their
manufacture. BLACK, it turned out, was the base
of a Taliban IED cell and it afforded insight into
current IED techniques and procedures. A large
amount of ammunition was found throughout
the battle area.
ISTAR resources then detected 30 enemy
moving west on a route south of the battle area
– they appeared to be fleeing. At 0745 hours the
Provincial Operations Centre reported that an
IED attack in Panjwayi District to the south had
killed two people – it was not clear whether they
were coalition forces, civilians, or police. One
interpretation was that it was designed to draw
attention away from the Howz-e Madad battle.
The next contact was at 0750 hours. Four
Taliban equipped with an RPG and PKM machine
gun were running away from the battle area.
Inexplicably, two pickup trucks with four Taliban
equipped with anti-tank weapons and then a
motorcycle team approached the battle area from
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Top: An US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack
aircraft performs a low-level straﬁng run ﬁring its 30 mm
cannon. Aircraft like these provided close air support
to Canadian and Afghan forces during the ﬁghting at
Howz-e Madad.
Centre: Private Glynn Doucette of India Company,
2 RCR, indicates how well things are going as he and
his section members set up an all-round defence.

US Air Force photo

Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad

Bottom: Badger armoured engineering vehicles are
used for hasty road repairs and for breaching operations
in close terrain. In this case, the damage caused by a
culvert IED on Route SUMMIT had to be dealt with.

southeast of Objective BLACK. A Leopard opened
fire with HESH and coaxial machine gun fire and
took them out at a range of 200 metres.

As LCol Walker and Major Quick planned the
withdrawal from Howz-e Madad, “C” Company, 3
PPCLI in Panjwayi reported that three Canadians
on a re-supply run on a Gator vehicle had been
blown up by a massive IED. This was a stunning
development. It was unlikely that this attack
was unrelated to the morning’s operations
and it was probable that it was designed to
draw off resources from the Howz-e Madad
operation. Indeed, ISTAR, medical, engineering,
and investigative resources would have to be
moved and employed in another district. They
would have to be protected. They might be
ambushed. They might require extraction. And
the battlegroup was not yet finished with Howz-

Photo by author

More information came in about the IED
strike in Panjwayi District. It turned out that a
Canadian vehicle was hit, but the situation was
developing. While 9er Tac was dealing with this
new incident, an A-10 on a strafing run fired
on the road next to an Afghan platoon narrowly
missing them. This resulted in a temporary check
fire. Another IED strike was reported in Panjwayi
District, but it was unclear if this was follow-on
reportage of the first incident or if it was another
incident.

CFJIC IS2007-7234

These two Leopards slowly advanced south
of BLACK when they were engaged by enemy
anti-tank weapons. One of Leopards, equipped
with a plough, took the hit on the device but the
vehicle remained operational. As this position
was slightly south of the limit of exploitation
established for the operation, they were ordered
back to BLACK.
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CFJIC IS2007-7247

CFJIC IS2007-7267

Above and below: Canadian soldiers search a suspected Taliban
compound.
Left: Corporal Cassidy Tait of India Company, 2 RCR returns from
clearing an Afghan compound

CFJIC IS2007-7266
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CFJIC IS2007-7250

Private Jamie Burton watches a gate leading from a garden
onto a pathway during the operation at Howz-e Madad.

e Madad. Sporadic engagements were occurring
around the perimeter.
One of these engagements involved an
insurgent equipped with a Dragunov sniper rifle.
This individual, firing at a range of 300 metres
from a rooftop and then a grape drying hut west
of Objective RED, was bracketing his Canadian
and Afghan targets but not actually hitting them.
What he lacked in experience, he tried to make
up with determination. There was talk about
using air power to get him, in part to boost the
morale of the Afghan troops he was targeting.
He was, however, mobile. One of the tank crew
commanders reported hearing the “crack-thump”
of the Dragunov within 10 metres of his vehicle.
The tank was instructed to pop smoke and then
pull away from the building so that a 500-pound
bomb could be used against the sniper.
The exfiltration of India Company, the
Afghans, and the tanks was not simply a
matter of driving away. As with every incursion

operation, the danger was that the force would
be ambushed on the way back to the MSG FOB.
The routes were predictable – Highway 1 to
SUMMIT with its culverts, across the Argendab,
and into the FOB. It was always possible that
suicide vehicle IED specialists from Kandahar
City could be requested by Zharey District
insurgents to attack along Highway 1. Another
cell could use its anti-tank weapons and so on.
A variety of deceptive means were employed to
reduce this possibility, but the ace in the hole
was a pair of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters
that suddenly arrived over head, both sporting
white “E”s on their undersides. Afghan police
would form a cordon between Howz-e Madad and
the exfiltrating force while the AH-64’s provided
top cover all the way back to MSG. There were
no further contacts on the way back to the FOB
and now attention shifted to dealing with the
aftermath of the Gator attack. This IED incident
completely overshadowed the Howz-e Madad
operation (which received no Canadian media
coverage) and dominated public discourse for
77
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Part of the haul taken back to base for analysis. Note the 82mm recoilless riﬂe and the brand-new rounds for it-with
Chinese markings.

several weeks while pundits debated the blame
and merits of using Gators in Afghanistan.

The Results

O

peration SEASONS was only one of several
similar incursions into Zharey District in
the summer of 2007. The cumulative effects of
the battlegroup plan are difficult to measure this
close to the action, but a tentative assessment
can be attempted. First, during the entire battle
commercial truck traffic on Highway 1 did not
abate at any time, even when there were air
strikes in progress and prodigious amounts of
tracer arced over the road. Civilian car traffic did
not stop either, though it tended to route itself
north of the action into the desert and then back
on to the highway. Thus far the enemy has been
unable to seriously interfere with the movement of
coalition or commercial traffic on this route. The
Howz-e Madad IED cell was forcibly dismantled
and it will take months to replace it.

The enemy has not been able to use Zharey
District as a mounting base for conventional
operations against Kandahar City. He has not
been able to attrit coalition or Afghan forces by
using the district as a trap as he has attempted to
do in the past. This key terrain remains disputed
and is dominated by coalition and Afghan forces.
The enemy has only been able to export terrorist
violence from Zharey into adjacent districts
with limited effect and he certainly does not
exert control over the population of the adjacent
districts. He has been unable to inflict mass
casualties during these operations and has
chosen to use massive IED attacks to do so with
the intent of generating strategic effects on the
population and political leadership in Canada.

In sum, Operation SEASONS successfully
built on the base established during previous
actions in Zharey District conducted throughout
2006. It demonstrates that denial can be as
important as occupation for key terrain, but
only temporarily. In order to succeed in Zharey
District, the population needs to shift its
allegiance to the government side. Until effective
governance capacity can be implemented in
Zharey District, denial will have to suffice. The
enemy’s decision to focus on Zharey ultimately
benefits the coalition forces and the Afghan
government as it permits reconstruction and aid
activities to continue elsewhere in the province to
the detriment of the Taliban cause. ISAF is happy
to oblige them.

Notes
1.

2.

In the interests of operational security, certain aspects
of the action have been blurred and the names of codenamed geographical locations have been changed.
The exception is Route SUMMIT, which has appeared
regularly in the media.
ISTAR or Intelligence Surveillance and Targeting systems
is a term used to represent the intelligence community
and the various surveillance platforms available to collect
the information. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are ISTAR
assets but not all ISTAR assets are UAVs.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical advisor
to the Chief of the Land Staff. He has travelled
annually to Afghanistan since 2003 to observe
coalition operations. He is the author of several
books including Enduring the Freedom: A
Rogue Historian in Afghanistan and the
forthcoming, Stabilizing Afghanistan: The
Return of a Rogue Historian.
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